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  This paper discusses the welfare effects, on groups, countries, and the world, of 
fragmentation.  Fragmentation here is defined as the introduction of a technology that permits a 
production process to be split into separate parts, with the fragments able to be done in different 
locations.  Standard results of trade theory and the gains from trade are then examined to see 
what they suggest about the gains from fragmentation.  The main points made are, first, that it is 
easy to find examples in which fragmentation hurts particular groups and countries, and even in 
some circumstances the world.  But I also argue that fragmentation is likely to increase world 
income overall, and therefore that it is likely to be beneficial on average.  Based on that, together 
with our general ignorance of what the more specific effects of fragmentation are likely to be, we 
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I.  Introduction 
A hot topic these days in the trade field is international outsourcing, or what is coming to 
be called “offshoring.”  This seems to mean the relocation of some aspect – but not all –  
of an industry’s productive activity to another country.  This has been happening for 
years in the form of trade in manufactured intermediate inputs, but recent advances in 
information technology have made it possible to do this with certain productive services 
as well, and the word “offshoring” seems to have accompanied that development.  In the 
public mind, offshoring seems to mean the “exporting of jobs,” and it suggests a pure loss 
to the country from which it occurs and especially for the workers who are replaced.  
This was no less true when the offshored jobs were primarily manufacturing jobs, but the 
recent inclusion of services has extended the threat from offshoring to an additional part 
of the population.  The threatened workers do not so far include economists, however, 
and to many of us offshoring just means the most recent manifestation of the international 
trade that we have been writing about for two centuries. It suggests, to us, gains to the 
participating countries and the world, if not necessarily to everyone within them. 
  There are a variety of ways that offshoring could have adverse effects, at least to 
some, that I am not best qualified to deal with.  These include macroeconomic effects if 
                                                 
* This paper was motivated by serving as discussant of Markusen (2005).  I have benefited particularly 
from talking with Juan Carlos Hallak about this topic. 
  1labor markets function poorly.  They include intellectual property issues, if hosts of an 
offshored activity copy a technology that they didn’t previously possess.  And they 
include the related effects that such a transfer of technology may have on the terms of 
trade, as was emphasized in a recent paper by Samuelson (2004) and has been examined 
recently by Jones and Ruffin (2005).  I will focus instead on only a simpler and well-
defined part of the issue:  what happens, in static models of trade, when it becomes 
possible to split a productive activity into parts that can now be done in different 
locations?  If, as a result, production that was previously done in one country is now done 
in two, what effect does this have on the welfare of the world, of the countries, and of 
groups within the countries?  I will call this, as I and others have done before, the issue of 
trade and fragmentation. 
  In what follows, I will recall some of the basic results of trade theory regarding 
the gains from trade, and then ask how these results can inform us regarding the gains 
from fragmentation. 
 
II.  Lessons from the Gains from Trade 
The gains from trade have been a major focus of economics almost since the discipline 
began.  Our current understanding, though, seems to date from contributions of 
Samuelson (1939, 1962), as elaborated by many authors such as Ohyama (1972) and 
Dixit and Norman (1980).  Much of this literature has dealt carefully with delineating 
what is to be meant by a country “gaining” from trade, an issue that I don’t want to dwell 
on here.  In the end, most treatments say, in essence, that if trade could potentially benefit 
all members of country’s population if their preferences and income were identical, then 
  2it is regarded as benefiting the country even though this assumption manifestly does not 
hold.  The justifications for this inference are various, usually resting on the potential for 
some sort of income redistribution among the country’s consumers. 
  The main lessons from the gains-from-trade literature for a country are the 
following: 
Lesson 1:  Free trade is better than autarky. 
Lesson 2:  Restricted trade (that is, trade that is less than free, restricted by trade barriers 
such as tariffs) is better than autarky. 
Lesson 3:  For a small country (that is, too small to influence world prices), free trade is 
better than restricted trade. 
Beyond these three results – which of course hold only under particular idealized 
assumptions, such as perfect competition, absence of externalities, etc. – the literature 
primarily tells us what we do not know.  We do not know, even under idealized 
conditions, that any move in the apparent direction of free trade is beneficial, even for a 
small country.   
That is, for example, in the presence of multiple tariffs, reducing or eliminating 
one of them may reduce welfare rather than raise it.  Only if the tariff that is reduced is 
the highest of all tariffs in ad valorem terms, can the case be made that this is welfare 
improving.
1  And certainly, reducing tariffs, even all of them, against one trading partner 
while keeping them unchanged against others may reduce welfare, as we have known 
since Viner (1950).  About the only thing that we do know seems to be that an equi-
                                                 
1 See Kowalczyk (1992). 
  3proportionate reduction in all tariffs, if they are specified and reduced in specific form 
rather than ad valorem form, will be welfare beneficial.
2 
What does this have to do with fragmentation?  One way of interpreting what has 
happened with fragmentation is to imagine that international fragmentation has always 
been possible technologically but that implicit barriers to trade have kept it from 
happening.  The rise of international fragmentation can then be thought of as the 
manifestation of reductions in these barriers, from prohibitive to nonexistent.  We can 
then apply the lessons of gains-from-trade theory to suggest what we do and do not know 
about the gains from fragmentation. 
Most immediately, if a country were small and if, aside from any trade that might 
arise from fragmentation, trade were free, then the opportunity to engage in international 
fragmentation would be a move from restricted trade to free trade and the country would 
have to gain, per Lesson 3.  But that seems to be all that we can say, based on the above 
lessons, since the other two start from autarky and thus are not relevant to anything 
currently of interest.  And on the contrary, the larger implication of this literature for 
fragmentation seems to be that, if a country is either large enough to affect its terms of 
trade, or if not all other aspects of its trade are free, then international fragmentation may 
cause its welfare to fall. 
In the following sections, I will look individually at several questions about the 
welfare effects of fragmentation.  It is possible, of course, that the negative message just 
derived is not in fact correct if one takes into account more fully the nature of 
fragmentation.  That is, to say that welfare may fall is not to say that it will fall, and there 
                                                 
2 Again, see Kowalczyk (1992), who shows  the negative result that equi-proportionate reductions in ad 
valorem tariffs may lower welfare. 
  4may be characteristics of fragmentation that make it different from other forms of trade 
liberalization.  So I will look at some particular models that have appeared in the 
literature and that provide examples of what may happen with fragmentation.  In 
addition, I will look at more than just the effect on a country, first focusing more 
narrowly on groups of factor-owners within a country, and then more broadly at effects 
on the world as a whole. 
 
III.  Can Fragmentation Hurt a Country? 
The answer, as I have already suggested, is yes.  The most obvious way that 
fragmentation can hurt a country as a whole is by causing a worsening of its terms of 
trade.  Of course, if a country is too small to affect world prices, and if fragmentation 
becomes a new possibility only for it and not for other countries (perhaps because they 
already have it), then this cannot alter world prices and cannot hurt the country on that 
account.  But the introduction of fragmentation, because it tends to be based in part on 
new technologies, is unlikely to be confined to a single country unless that country is 
simply a laggard behind its adoption in the rest of the world.  And if fragmentation 
becomes a new possibility for all countries, then of course that can easily alter world 
prices to the benefit of some and the detriment of others. 
  An example can be found in Deardorff (2001b), where a Ricardian model has two 
countries producing and trading two goods, initially without fragmentation.  It then 
becomes possible to fragment the technology for producing one of them into two parts, 
with each country having its own labor requirements for accomplishing each part.  The 
model illustrates the possibility that this new ability to fragment may cause a change in 
  5world equilibrium relative prices, and it is possible that one country’s terms of trade 
could worsen sufficiently that it is made worse off, even accounting for the new 
technological ability that fragmentation represents. 
  That model is abstract, so it may be helpful to sketch a more concrete example 
that is loosely based on the model.  Suppose that the world produces two products, a 
numeraire good in the production of which all countries are equally productive, and a 
traded service, which I’ll call banking, in which their productivities differ.  The 
technology of banking requires two activities:  data entry and accountancy.  Our country 
of interest is more productive than the world in accountancy, but less productive in data 
entry.  Initially, however, these two activities must be done in the same place, and as it 
happens we have a large enough advantage in accountancy to more than offset our 
disadvantage in data entry, with the result that we have a comparative advantage in 
banking.  Thus, at the start, we export banking even though we are not so good at one of 
activities that it requires.  Suppose further that, even though we produce only banking 
services, the world demands somewhat more than we can produce and therefore the 
world price of banking is determined in the rest of the world, where its comparative 
disadvantage in banking makes the relative price higher, in terms of the numeraire, than 
the cost to us if we were to produce the numeraire ourselves.  Indeed, it is this higher 
world price that yields for us a substantial gain from trade. 
  Now suppose that a new communication technology makes it possible to produce 
banking services with data entry and accountancy happening in different locations.  Our 
banks will naturally begin to outsource the data entry, which can be done more cheaply 
abroad.  The problem for us as a country can be seen quite simply:  by outsourcing data 
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terms of trade.   
Now if it were possible for us to outsource all data entry, then our gain from trade 
would only increase, as we would be specializing even more completely than we had 
before in what we do best, accountancy.  But suppose that the world does not demand 
enough bank services for us to occupy our entire labor force producing only them, now 
that our potential output is expanded by our ability to outsource the data entry that we 
were not good at doing before.  If that is the case, then we will have to produce the 
numeraire good as well, and this does indeed require a fall in the relative price of 
banking. 
Notice, incidentally, that this example – in both the abstract model of Deardorff 
(2001b) and the banking example described here – does not involve any transfer of 
technology to the rest of the world as occurs in Samuelson (2004).  Productivities differ 
across countries in both data entry and accountancy, but these productivities do not 
change when fragmentation becomes possible.  However, fragmentation does in general 
permit activities within industries to be allocated more efficiently across the globe, and 
this tends to reduce those industries’ costs.  It is not surprising, then, that such a fall in 
costs can lower prices as well, and thus worsen a country’s terms of trade. 
A second way that fragmentation can hurt a country is if its markets are already 
distorted and fragmentation makes a distortion worse.  The adverse effect of that 
worsening may more than offset the cost reduction that is permitted by fragmentation. 
In tariff theory we know, for example, that a reduction of a single tariff, if it is not 
the country’s highest tariff, can be welfare worsening.  This might occur, for example, if 
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the fall in price of the first reduces demand for the second, reducing still further its 
imports which were already made too low by its own tariff.  By thus worsening the 
distortionary effect of the higher tariff, the tariff reduction may lower welfare.  By a 
similar mechanism, fragmentation might permit the outsourcing of an activity that is 
strongly substitutable for an input that is imported subject to a high tariff.  In such a case 
it might make the distortion caused by the tariff worse and reduce the country’s welfare. 
I don’t doubt that there may be other mechanisms by which fragmentation might 
reduce a country’s welfare, both if fragmentation becomes newly possible for only a 
country’s own industry, and especially if it alters the structure of production throughout 
the world.  Countries differ greatly in their positions in world markets and in their own 
trade and other policies, and it would be surprising if examples of loss from what is in 
effect a new technology could not be constructed.  But this is not at all to suggest that 
loss from fragmentation will be in some sense more common than gain.  I will say more 
about this below, but for now it bears mentioning that it is just as easy, if not more so, to 
construct examples in which countries gain from fragmentation. 
 
IV.  Can Fragmentation Hurt Groups within a Country? 
Again the answer is yes, even more easily.  We know from Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) trade 
theory that a change in relative prices is very likely to reduce the real wage of at least one 
factor of production.  So if groups within a country derive their incomes from different 
factors, some group will lose from any change in relative prices.  And fragmentation is 
sure to cause prices to change.  The only chance for owners of a losing factor not to lose 
  8would be if fragmentation creates some other source of gain in which they share.  That 
may happen, but it is certainly not assured. 
  The effect of changing relative prices on real factor returns is of course familiar as 
the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, which takes its strongest form in the textbook two-
good, two-factor model with incomplete specialization.
3  But a fall in the real wage of 
some factor is equally assured if there is incomplete specialization and if there are many 
goods and factors, as well as in the specific-factors model.  To offset this, we would need 
additional benefits from complete specialization, or from some non-H-O properties such 
as increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition, or variety.
4 
  Exactly which groups of factor owners may lose from fragmentation, on the other 
hand, is very much an open question.  The presumption in much public discussion has 
always been that “outsourcing” would be of unskilled-labor-intensive inputs and that it 
would therefore drive down the wage of unskilled labor.  More recent concern with 
“offshoring” has focused on services, sometimes provided by more skilled workers such 
as computer programmers, medical technicians, or engineers, and the expectation has 
been that it would lower the wages of these occupations.   That may well be, although 
theory has suggested that this outcome is not assured. 
  Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), for example, showed that international 
fragmentation could as easily have one effect on relative factor prices as another, 
depending on the detailed factor intensities of the fragments and the industries prior to 
fragmentation.  Deardorff (2001a) explored further such options, showing in particular 
                                                 
3 See Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and, for a review of more recent developments, Deardorff (1994). 
4 See Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1993) for a discussion of how these “New Trade Theory” effects may 
interact with the Stolper-Samuelson mechanism. 
  9that fragmentation may actually drive relative factor prices in different countries further 
apart.  All of this was reinforced in the simulations of Markusen (2005). 
 
V.  Can Fragmentation Hurt the World? 
Here I would like to argue that the answer is no, or at least that this is so in the absence of 
distortions with which fragmentation might adversely interact.   
The argument is simple, if we keep in mind the definition of fragmentation as a 
new technological possibility that becomes available to a country or to the world.  Such a 
possibility, since it does not reduce the availability of any previous technology, can only 
expand the world’s production possibilities.  Then, in the absence of distortions, a 
perfectly competitive free-trade world economy is known to maximize the value of world 
output on the world production possibility set, and this maximum cannot fall.  On the 
contrary, it will rise if the new technology is used at all by users who find it strictly 
preferable to previous practice. 
From this one concludes that, while fragmentation may hurt particular countries 
or groups within countries as the previous sections suggested, it must always benefit 
other countries or groups by at least as much, and probably more.  This means, in turn, 
that if it were possible to redistribute income across countries and/or groups without 
creating distortions, then such redistribution could accompany the introduction of 
fragmentation so as to leave everybody in the world at least as well off.  As usual with 
our gains-from-trade propositions, the gain to others may be of little comfort to those 
who lose, since no one seriously expects sufficient compensation to take place.  But from 
the safety of the academic ivory tower, we trade economists are accustomed to 
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other interpretation to buttress this conclusion. 
But first I want to address the rather serious qualification to the result just 
mentioned:  that it holds only in a perfect world with no distortions.  Like the role of 
distortions in section III, the presence of distortions can render harmful an otherwise 
desirable change if it makes the impact of the distortion worse.  This is of course the 
message of the Theory of the Second Best, which we owe to Lipsey and Lancaster 
(1956).  Even though this theory is customarily applied to the effects of reducing one 
distortion, such as a tariff, in the presence of another, it applies just as well to any change 
that would otherwise be welfare improving, such as an improvement in technology.  And 
fragmentation is exactly such a new technology. 
How might fragmentation therefore hurt a distorted world?  It is not hard to 
construct an example, although it is purely hypothetical. 
Suppose that there existed a good the production or consumption of which 
imposed a large negative externality on the world, and the production of which required 
two activities or inputs that, as it happened, did not both exist in any single country of the 
world.  Suppose, for example, that production of cigarettes required both tobacco – which 
could only be grown in a few places on Earth where the soil was appropriate – and the 
delicate hands of a genetically distinct population of cigarette rollers to roll the tobacco 
into cigarettes, with this population living only in parts of the world that lacked tobacco 
soil.  To avoid letting simple trade solve this problem, suppose that tobacco before it is 
rolled into cigarettes is extremely perishable, so that once cut from the plant it becomes 
useless in minutes if not rolled immediately.  The result of these tortuous assumptions, 
  11clearly, is that the world would have no cigarettes and – here the strain on reality is less 
severe – people would be healthier. 
Now suppose that fragmentation of this technology becomes possible, so that 
growing tobacco and rolling it into cigarettes can after all be done in different locations.  
How?  Perhaps a preservative that allows the tobacco to survive shipment.  Or perhaps 
some extraordinary extension on the arms of the cigarette rollers so that they can reach 
from where they live to where the tobacco is grown and do their job.  (I did say that this 
was hypothetical.)  Now, suddenly, the world gets a thriving cigarette industry, and 
people start to die of lung cancer, though before that some of them live more happily 
because of the joys of smoking.  Whether the world is better off or worse off depends on 
weighting the internalized benefits against the externalized costs, but it is certainly 
possible, at least if the costs do include truly external ones from second hand smoke, that 
the introduction here of fragmentation has lowered world welfare. 
As usual with second best arguments, however, the cause of the loss is not really 
fragmentation, but rather the absence of a first-best policy to deal with the externality.  If 
countries had been willing and able to tax cigarette smoking by an amount that equaled 
the external cost to society, then whatever smoking took place after fragmentation would 
provide benefits exceeding this cost and the world would have gained.  If such benefits 
could not exceed the costs, then the industry would not appear at all, even when 
fragmentation made it technically possible, and the possibility of fragmentation would 
have had no effect at all. 
This example rested on the existence of an externality, the presence of which is 
well known to undermine the welfare theorems of economics.  What if the only distortion 
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fragmentation, although it is not as stark. 
Suppose that the manufacture of cars requires an input of steel and the combined 
activities of design, which does not use the steel, and assembly, which does.  Consider a 
country that has comparative advantage in both design and assembly, due to its 
endowments of various types of workers, perhaps, but a comparative disadvantage in 
steel.  And suppose that initially design and assembly have to be done in the same place.  
If there were free trade, the country would import steel and produce (both design and 
assemble) cars, and export them.  But now suppose that for some extraneous political 
reason the country has a tariff on imports of steel, pushing its price above the world price.  
Depending on the sizes of its advantages in design and assembly, it may still have a 
comparative advantage in producing cars, in spite of the higher priced steel. 
But now suppose that it becomes possible to fragment production into separate 
design and assembly stages that can be done in different places.  By moving assembly 
abroad, car companies can continue to exploit their comparative advantage in design 
while giving up their comparative advantage in assembly in return for lower priced steel.  
Steel imports go down, as do car exports which are presumably shipped directly from the 
now-foreign assembly plants to their final markets. 
I believe that this change could be harmful for the world.  The tariff on steel was 
reducing steel imports below their free-market levels, and presumably also reducing the 
extent to which the world took advantage of the home country’s comparative advantages 
in design and assembly.  Fragmentation, here, reduces steel imports still further, although 
it may increase the use of steel in producing cars.  More important, it reduces the extent 
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which has moved offshore to a place where, if it were not for the lower priced steel, costs 
would be higher.  On the other hand, it has made it possible to benefit more from the 
country’s services in car design.  So the outcome may be good or bad.  But it seems clear 
that this is an example in which, in the presence of a tariff, the introduction of a form of 
fragmentation could be harmful to the world. 
 
VI.  Should We Care about the World? 
Of course we should, in the sense of caring about everybody in the world.  But what I 
mean here is:  Should we care about the effect of fragmentation on the aggregate welfare 
of the world, as defined here and routinely in international trade theory?  That is, if we 
believed that the world were close enough to an undistorted state for the results there to 
be meaningful, would we then find useful the result that fragmentation benefits the 
world?  Or alternatively, if we believed not only that distortions exist but also that they 
correlate with the effects of fragmentation in a way that it will lower world welfare, 
should we then oppose fragmentation on that account alone?   
Perhaps not, in both cases.  Some might argue that, since compensating income 
redistribution will never occur, what matters is how we weight the effects on winners and 
losers, not whether the winners could compensate the losers if we made them do it.  Most 
likely, I think, many would regard a change that benefits the rich and hurts the poor as 
undesirable, even if the money-value of the gain in the sense of, say, equivalent variation 
is somewhat larger than that of the loss.  And a change that does the opposite might be 
welcomed, again even if it fails the compensation test.  If so, then the questions about 
  14trade and fragmentation should focus not on their aggregate welfare effects but on their 
effects on income distribution.  That would take us back to section IV, where we would 
ask how fragmentation affects the wages of skilled versus unskilled workers.  And it 
would take us into the whole literature on “trade and wages” where such questions have 
been addressed, both theoretically and empirically.
5 
But while I certainly think that questions about income distribution are important, 
I also think that results concerning aggregate world welfare are worth pursuing for 
fragmentation as well, just as they are for more traditional questions of international 
trade.  For the fact is that we are incredibly ignorant about what distributional affects will 
be, when we think about fragmentation in general and not in very specific cases.  If the 
theoretical literature teaches us anything, it is that anything can happen.  For any given 
country, or even any given group within a country, the general possibility of 
fragmentation may be helpful or harmful.  And while it might be possible, with sufficient 
information about the details of a particular example of fragmentation to remove this 
ambiguity empirically, this could surely not be done for all the forms of fragmentation 
that are arising over time in the world. 
In our ignorance, therefore, the best that we may be able to do is to take a bet on 
whether fragmentation overall is likely to be good or bad.  And for that, in the case of an 
undistorted world economy, the aggregate welfare result is clear.  Because it says that 
fragmentation must raise world welfare, it is also saying that it raises individual welfare 
on average across the world’s countries and groups.  Unless, therefore, you have reason 
to think that a person, group, or country that you care about (the poor, for example) will 
                                                 
5 See Freeman (1995). 
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than you should bet in favor of fragmentation rather than against it. 
Now in the case of traditional trade – rather than fragmentation – we actually do 
have reason to expect systematic departures from the average.  That reason is the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem.  If we view the world as comprised of relatively high paid skilled 
workers and relatively low paid unskilled workers, the former more abundant in the rich 
world and the latter more abundant in the poor world, then Stolper-Samuelson tells us 
systematically that trade will make the income distribution more uneven in the rich world 
and more even in the poor, or more importantly that it will raise real wages of unskilled 
workers in the South and lower them in the North.  One could easily have an opinion on 
which of these effects to take most seriously.  And even without that, one could hardly 
comfort the losers from trade with the argument that they might just as well have been 
born into a different group or country, so the average is all that matters.   
On the other hand, although the message of Stolper-Samuelson is clear, it is not at 
all clear that it tells the whole story of the effects of trade, for all sorts of reasons that 
trade theorists have explored.  And these reasons tend – as I see it, at least – to add all 
sorts of reasons why particular groups may be affected differently by trade than Stolper-
Samuelson suggests, both within the framework of the Heckscher-Ohlin model (adding 
more factors, for example, or allowing for complete specialization) and outside it (the 
New Trade Theory). 
On the other hand, these same extensions and modifications of simple trade 
theory also tend to add more reasons why the effects of trade on aggregate world welfare 
are likely to be positive, with the gain presumably therefore larger than might have been 
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our ignorance we should look at the average effects of trade, and that these average 
effects are probably positive. 
Returning to the question of fragmentation, I would say that this conclusion is 
even stronger.  In the case of fragmentation we do not even have a simple result like 
Stolper-Samuelson.  That is, even in the simplest model where Stolper-Samuelson tells 
the whole story for trade, the introduction of fragmentation in a particular industry may 
help or hurt, say, unskilled labor in either country.  This is the message we saw above 
from Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and Deardorff (2001a).  And of course more 
complicated models will yield even greater confusion, if that is possible – see Markusen 
(2005).  That being the case, the result that fragmentation raises total – and therefore 
average – world welfare may be the best that we can do. 
Of course, this result is true only in an undistorted world, which most people 
would regard as pretty remote from the one we live in.  What do distortions do to this 
conclusion?  I’ve argued in Section V that in the presence of distortions, fragmentation 
can lower aggregate world welfare.  But to say that it can, does not by any means mean 
that it will.  For every example where fragmentation hurts a distorted economy, I am sure 
one could construct another example where it helps. 
The issue, in all cases, will be whether fragmentation makes the harm done by the 
distortion worse, usually by shifting activity further away from what would have been 
optimal, or does it reduce that harm by shifting activity toward the optimum. On average 
one might suppose – again if we are completely ignorant about the details of what will 
happen, as I believe in essence that we are – that fragmentation is as likely to do one as to 
  17do the other.  And in that case, the fact that fragmentation must systematically expand 
what the world is able potentially to do with its given resources should mean that, again, 
on average fragmentation will be beneficial. 
  
VI.  Conclusion? 
My conclusions about the gains from fragmentation, then, are very similar to the 
conclusions of trade theory more generally about the gains from trade:  It is certainly true 
that examples of fragmentation can be found that lower the welfare of particular 
individuals, groups, and countries, and even of the world as a whole if they interact 
negatively with existing distortions such as externalities and tariffs.  But in an important 
average sense, fragmentation is very likely to expand world welfare. 
So what?  I have treated fragmentation here as a technological change that makes 
it possible to do something that was not possible before, on the grounds that much of the 
visible fragmentation today seems to have been made possible by improvements in the 
technologies of communication and transportation.  Does anyone seriously propose 
reversing those technological changes, even if it were possible?  Of course not.  So 
perhaps it doesn’t matter from a policy perspective whether fragmentation is good or bad 
– it is simply an unavoidable fact of modern life. 
But people do propose using policies to prevent those technologies from being 
taken advantage of, especially through fragmentation.  In my own state of Michigan, our 
governor (whom I otherwise largely respect) has tried to limit the state government’s 
purchases from firms that outsource abroad.  John Kerry (whom I also otherwise respect), 
in his run for U.S. president, railed against “Benedict Arnold Companies” that betray our 
  18nation by sourcing abroad, and he proposed a change in the tax code that was supposed to 
discourage this.  And while at the moment U.S. concerns about trade seem to be more 
traditional – textiles from China, sugar from the Caribbean – I will be surprised if we do 
not hear more demands for policies to interfere somehow with firms that shift activities 
abroad. 
These policies will seldom be as simple as an import tariff, just because 
fragmentation today often does not involve a physical product crossing a border.  
Therefore our standard arguments against tariffs, and the associated labeling of those who 
favor them as “protectionists,” will seem not to apply.  We will need to be creative in 
arguing against them.  This will be especially hard given our tendency, as I have 
illustrated in this paper, to find particular cases in which fragmentation has adverse 
effects.
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